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Internationalism, Regionalism, and National
Culture: Music Control in Bavaria, 1945-1948
David Monod
FOR many Germans in the immediate postwar period, all that remainedof their country was its art. Subjugation, destruction, the pain of unfath-omable guilt: these had ripped away at the national psyche, severing
nation from nationalism, person from people, the present from the past. "We
are," wrote Wolfgang Borchert in 1946, "a generation without a homecoming,
because we have nothing to which we can return." Nation: what would that
word now mean? An occupied state no longer possessing statehood, a con-
quered people starved even of the moral strength that might come from resist-
ing. Even if the institutions of national governance could be recreated, they
could have no historical legitimacy; if Bonn were not to be Weimar, it would
equally not be the kaisers' or the Fiihrer's Berlin. For many, refuge from the
shaming of the nation lay, as Theodor Heuss reflected, in a "decentralizing of
the emotions," in a "flight" to those fields "where the violence of the great
political world shake-up is not felt so directly."1 This drove literate Germans
back to Goethe and music lovers to the endlessly-performed postwar sym-
phonic cycles of Brahms and Beethoven. And yet, escaping into what Jost
Hermand aptly termed "the protective wall of self-absorption" did not com-
pletely preclude connection to the national community of Germans.2 In fact, a
Warm thanks to Ulrich Bausch.Jeffry Diefendorf, Joan Evans, and Michael Kater for their com-
ments.
1. Wolfgang Borchert, "Generation ohne Abschied," in idem, Draussen vor der Tur und ausgewdhlte
Erzdhlungen (Hamburg, 1966), 125; Heuss cited in Peter Merkl, The Origin of the West German
Republic (New York, 1963), 29.
2. Jost Hermand, Kultur im Wiederaujbau (Munich, 1986), 70-71; Wolfgang Benz, Potsdam 1945
(Munich, 1986), 183; Reiner Pommerin, "Some Remarks on the Cultural History of the Federal
Republic of Germany," in Culture in the Federal Republic of Germany, ed. Reiner Pommerin (Oxford,
1996), 4. As the American music officer in Berlin remarked; "The word festival usually implies
gaiety and happy times. The Germans, however, organize a Fest (festival) on an even numbered
anniversary of any famous citizen's birth or death and then drench the public in his works until it
cries for help. Schubert had his turn recendy, and we are now in the middle of Brahms-Fest." John
Bitter, Weekly Report, 26 March 1947, National Archives (NA), RG 260, Office of the Military
Government (U.S.), (OMGUS), Education and Cultural Relations Division, Cultural Affairs
Branch, Records Relating to Theater and Music, Box 242. All OMGUS documents cited hereafter
are in NA, RG 260.
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powerful communion with the whole might still come through the personal
enjoyment of a shared art or culture. In art might reside the essence of the
national community, a stateless collectivity, without territories perhaps, but with
borders and guardians nonetheless.
It struck social scientists as odd, when they came in the 1950s to quantifying
these things, that West Germans expressed so little faith in the institutions of
their nation state. In 1959, only 7 percent of West Germans admitted pride in
their political system, though a far higher percentage were satisfied with the
country's recent economic performance. But there was, in truth, nothing anom-
alous about these results. Surveys made in the American sector at the time of
the writing of the Basic Law found that the vast majority of Germans were not
only uninformed about their constitution, they were uninterested in it as well.
For the majority of West Germans, national pride remained unexpressed: an
emotion too dangerous in its overtones and associations. In consequence, as
David Clay Large has noted, in its early years the federal state "suffered from an
acute lack of national identity."3
Regions fared much better, and for obvious reasons. In accordance with the
Potsdam Protocol, municipal and Lander (state) governments under German
control were the first to be reinstated after the war — with appointed leaders in
the summer of 1945, and with elected governments following over the course
of 1946 — for while government officials at these levels were certainly tainted
by Nazism, the institutions of governance themselves seemed relatively free
from criminal associations. There was, for example, no question of the Ame-
rican army running Munich, even though its former position as capital of the
Nazi movement and a focus of party identification might conceivably have
left it vulnerable to the same type of direct control as befell the zone of occu-
pation.4 But the Allies felt that they needed to work with German authorities
on some level, and cities and Lander simply did not appear important enough
politically, or in terms of their ideational associations, to administer directly for
long. In fact, because the Western Allies thought Nazi Germany to have been
3. Lutz Reuter, "Political and Moral Culture in West Germany: Four Decades of Democratic
Reorganization and Vergangenheitsauseinandersetzung" in Coping with the Past: Germany and
Austria after 1945, eds. Kathy Harms, Lutz Reuter and Volker Duerr (Madison, 1990), 166; Richard
L. Merritt, Democracy Imposed: US Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945-1949 (New Haven,
1995), 346; David Clay Large, "Uses of the Past: The Anti-Fascist Resistance Legacy in the Federal
Republic of Germany," in Contending with Hitler: Varieties of German Resistance in the Third Reich, ed.
David Clay Large (Cambridge, 1991), 163.
4. In fact, in their initial planning for occupation governance, the Americans had conceived of
directly running every level of government, including cities and towns. The opposition of the
British, together with a recognition of the huge manpower resources that would be required for
such an undertaking, led to the adoption of an indirect control model. For insight into the debate,
see: AFHQ, Appreciation and Outline Plan, 24 March 1943, in Civil Affairs: Soldiers become Governors,
ed. Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg (Washington, 1964), 170-71 and the subsequent cor-
respondence between Charles Spofford and Lord Rennell and between Roosevelt and Churchill,
Coles, ibid., 171-73.
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a highly centralized state — in the Prussian tradition — strong municipal and
federal institutions were seen as a part of Germany's political reeducation.
Paradoxically then, though regional and local governments dealt with issues of
paramount concern to ordinary citizens — schooling, cultural institutions, pub-
lic works, rationing, taxation, and public transit — the Western Allies on these
levels quickly assigned to themselves a mere supervisory role.5
In attempting to establish their own legitimacy, many of the newly consti-
tuted Lander and municipal governments rushed to embrace a memorialized
past. Gothic cathedrals, baroque palaces, rococo theaters, these became memen-
toes of a localized, princely Germany without aspirations to Lebensraum. They
could be recovered without shame and lovingly restored. As the prominent lib-
eral economist, Wilhelm Ropke, declared in 1946: "Germany must regain her
character as a 'nation of nations' and return to the good traditions from which,
three generations ago, she departed to her undoing, this is the cure for . . . our
German malady." The task here should not be minimized: the Americans esti-
mated in 1947 that more than half of all the historic buildings in their zone had
been damaged. In Bavaria, for example, much of the old city of Munich had
been gutted, and its royal heart — the Residenz Palace and the Frauenkirche —
were in ruins. Nuremberg, in the meantime, had its city center reduced to
almost eleven million cubic meters of rubble. Still, the decision made in so
many places — to restore rather than create anew — revealed a desire for con-
nectedness and it was commonly to an autonomist, preunification past that
localities turned. Monuments of the Nazi period, such as Munich's Fiihrerbau,
the party headquarters, or the Haus der Deutschen Kunst survived only because
the Americans occupied them. Left to their own devices, the municipal author-
ities would have leveled these symbols of a nation they now wished to forget.
The history that was to be made spatially manifest in ersatz form was the safe
past, the dialect past: Reformation Freiburg, Wittelsbach Munich, medieval
Nuremberg. It was as though old stones and new mortar could block out the
crack of the bombs and seal away the memory of the regime that had brought
them down.6
5. Benz, Potsdam 1945, 119-31; H. Maier, "Die Entwicklung der kommunalen Politik und
Organisation in den drei westlichen Besatzungszonen," in Vorgeschichte der Bundesrepublik
Deutschltmd: Zwischen Kapitulation und Grundgesetz, ed. Josef Becker, Theo Stammen, and Peter
Waldmann (Munich, 1979), 341-45; FRUS, 1945, vol. 3, 954-55, 961-64; L. Clay to J. McCloy,
16 September 1945 and L. Clay to D.D. Eisenhower, 26 May 1946, in The Papers of Lucius D. Clay,
vol. I, ed.Jean E. Smith (Bloomington, 1974), 76, 215.
6. Ropke cited in Peter Alter, "Nationalism and German Politics after 1945," in The State of
Germany, ed. John Breuilly (London, 1992), 170; Jeffry M. Diefendorf, In the Wake of War: The
Reconstruction of Germany after World War II (New York, 1993), 15, 66-107; for the importance of
local identities after 1945: Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat
(Berkeley, 1990), 228—46, and Heide Fehrenbach, "Cinema, Spectatorship and the Problem of
Postwar German Identity," in The American Impact on Postwar Germany, ed. Reiner Pommerin
(Providence, 1995), 165-95. For the intricate relationship between preservation and national
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The Americans, like the other Western occupiers, regarded this surging
localism with alternating feelings of favor and frustration. Strong regional gov-
ernments made good sense in 1945-1946, when the discredited national
institutions were replaced by an Allied Control Council and when the goal of
policy was the eradication of the governmental behemoth. But as policy
shifted fast, over the unstable ground of Bizonia and toward the solidity of the
anti-Soviet Western zone, regional identifications came to appear more as
obstacles than avenues. The Lander were resistant to zonal school reform, they
obstructed the bizonal economic charter, they refused to accept a common pol-
icy on civil service reform. As the American military governor, Lucius Clay,
lamented, although "a loose confederation of states cannot possibly cope with
the conditions which will exist in Germany for several years to come . . . the
power of the states has developed so rapidly that it will be difficult to adopt a
constitution which gives the central administration sufficient power."7 For the
occupiers, however, options were limited. If particularism had to be fought, so
too did what the Americans, at least, conceived to be Germany's national cul-
ture. Nazism, they believed, was the hideous offspring of national traditions, and
in particular German predilections for obedience, anti-Semitism, cultural supe-
riority, romanticism, and militarism. It was the victor's task to show the van-
quished that they were not cultural giants; to humble them by revealing to them
both the crimes committed in the name of their vaunted inheritance as well as
the qualities other nations possessed. And so, in lieu of localism, the Allies
offered supraregional institutions, and in place of German culture, they offered
internationalism. These two ideological pillars of allied policy made sense in
terms of what at least the British and Americans ultimately hoped would
emerge in Germany: a powerful prowestern presence in the center of Europe;
a stable democracy; and an integrated West European economy.
These may seem grand designs, traceable only at the highest levels — in
Washington, London, Berlin, or Bonn — but their influence could be felt
throughout the various branches of MG (Military Government). Although local
officers may not have appreciated the strategic sweep of their mission, they
understood their immediate objectives and, like good military men, struggled to
attain them. The war, it must be remembered, had not ended for MG officials
in May 1945. The Third Reich had been defeated militarily, but real victory,
they believed, could only be won with the destruction of the culture in which
identity see Rudy Koshar, Germany's Transient Past: Preservation and National Memory in the Twentieth
Century (Chapel Hill, 1998), chap. 5. Koshar, however, sees postwar urban restoration as involving a
more direct dialogue with the immediate past and a less regionalized set of identifications than sug-
gested here.
7. L. Clay to W Draper, 7 February 1948, in The Papers of Lucius D. Clay, vol. II, 557; the strug-
gle of the bizonal administration to work around regional sensibilities can be traced in Heinrich
Troeger, Interregnum: Tagebuch des Generalsekretars des Ldnderrats der Bizone, 1947—49, ed., Wolfgang
Benz and Constantin Goschler (Munich, 1985), esp. 33-43.
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Nazism had developed. It was the particular job of the Army's cultural officers
to isolate and destroy those elements of nationalism, cultural chauvinism, and
militaristic order which they detected within the German tradition. The great
struggle they waged for the soul of Germany was called reeducation by the
Allies, and the main obstacle to its success was thought to be the public's pride
in its own cultural inheritance. It was in the form of reeducation that the occu-
pation's grand strategic plan surged through the apparatus of military govern-
ment and came to be fought even by the runt of the MG litter: the Music
Control Office in Bavaria.
The music section of the military governments Information Control
Division (ICD) developed from the confluence of two separate streams. The
first, and oldest, was the Office of War Information (OWI), an agency created
in the summer of 1942 to filter the words and images that were flowing to the
American public. As part of its European operations, OWI ran a radio station
based in London, as well as a series of often mobile, local outposts in neutral,
friendly, and, as the war progressed, liberated countries. From its outposts, OWI
not only collected material for U.S. consumption, it also provided information
and a wire service for local newspapers, lending libraries stocked with American
books and magazines, documentary and other films to local theaters, and it
organized musical and visual art activities showcasing American talent. After the
war, the OWI outpost in Austria would provide the essential framework, mate-
rials, and personnel to the Army when it assumed authority over the American
sector, while the New York office of the agency would come under War Depart-
ment control and would become the coordinating and buying center for infor-
mation control divisions in both Austria and Germany. The second stream, and
the one that provided the infrastructure and personnel for Germany's Military
Government, was the Army's Psychological Warfare Division (PWD). The
Army had not really concerned itself with music until March 1945; even
though prior to that time PWD had engaged in a variety of propaganda-rela-
ted activities involving the arts, and it did have an entertainment division that
was tailoring information concerning American culture for enemy consump-
tion. Music joined theater, literature, and film as an interest of the entertainment
unit around the time of the capture of the Radio Luxembourg facilities. The
Army used the radio station to broadcast into Germany and, in addition to news
and military directives, it carried music drawn from both British and U.S.
sources and operated its own orchestra. The demand for recordings for broad-
cast, as well as the realization that musicians, alongside other artists, would need
to be cleared prior to allowing them to perform in a vanquished Germany, led
to the formation of a music branch of the entertainment division.8 Ultimately,
8. On OWI: Alan Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information (New Haven,
1978), 118-28; F.Q. Eaton, "Music as a Weapon," Musical America (10 February 1945): 27. On
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this element would attain section status when PWD reorganized itself as the
Information Control Division in the summer of 1945.
The music section of the Theater and Music Branch, ICD, was never large.
In Bavaria, it was made up initially of two full-time officers and two German
secretaries. All told, there were around a dozen music officers serving in the
American Zone in 1945, a number that was reduced steadily to a skeletal staff
of six by 1948. The numbers, however, do not reflect the scope of the sections
tasks, as the music officers would draw on the expertise of individuals in other
areas of military government for specific jobs. In the early months, for example,
the music officers were preoccupied with the licensing of musicians, but here
they concerned themselves only with influencing the overall decision-making
process. Information on licensees was provided to the music section through a
German-staffed bureau that aided musicians in filling out their Fragebogen (ques-
tionnaires), or business information statements. The material thus presented was
then cross-checked through the Intelligence Branch and, where necessary, in-
terviews were conducted by either music or intelligence officers or both,
and clearance came from the Liaison and Security Office at Special Branch;
licenses were issued, initially through the Theater and Music Branch and later
through a separate agency. The music officers had the responsibility, in cooper-
ation with the Intelligence Branch, for supervising the activities of license-
holders. The music officers, then, provided central coordination for the whole
process and were charged with offering advice to the other branches and
answering complaints from artists caught up in the process. Similarly, the sec-
tion officers' other major tasks, promoting music that had been banned under
the Nazis, securing travel permits for musicians, acting as liaison between the
cultural ministries and the military, providing seats and tickets to American
personnel, and making travel arrangements for visiting American artists, all
involved innumerable MG and German officials. The extraordinary range of
their activities and their heavy dependence on others, involving, as it invariably
did, unpredictable delays and cumbersome procedures, was the music officers'
universal complaint.
Impresario, ticket handler, licensing official, cultural attache, agent of dena-
zification: the music officer worked polyphonically. But it was in his central tasks
of purifying the channels of German art culture, of denazification, and
of promoting music banned or disfavored during the Third Reich, that the
music officer ran up most powerfully against the forces of localism and had to
come most directly to grips with the problem of German national culture. His
PWD: D. Taylor, memo, 12 January 1945 and D. Taylor to G.I. De Beer, 30 May 1945, NA, GG331,
SHAEF, PWD, Box 24, Entry 87; Maritta Hein-Kremer's detailed discussion of the lending libraries
provides an excellent introduction to the coordination of OWI/PWD activities, see Die amerikani-
sche Kulturojfenswe, 1945—1955: Griindung und Entwicklung des amerikanischen Information Centers in
Westdeutschland und West Berlin (Cologne, 1996), esp. chap. 2.
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work, in this regard, has not been previously studied, but some branches of ICD
have, and the direction of the received wisdom is fairly straightforward. In gen-
eral terms, denazification and reorientation have suffered from the same bad
press that has dogged most of the divisions of OMGUS (Office of Military Gov-
ernment, United States). Though German scholars such as Ulrich Bausch and
Norbert Frei have, in recent years, found much to praise in the work of the
ICD officers,9 and almost everyone has kind words for the American Military
Governor, Lucius Clay, the prevailing view has been that MG suffered from
employing personnel poorly trained for their jobs that included complicated
procedures and unclear, unworkable, and unreasonable goals. According to
Edward Peterson, "MG simply did not have the people with skills to run the
country . . . [and] quickly became irrelevant, except that it was in the way. It
delayed solutions to problems until, strategically retreating, it permitted the
Germans to solve them." In the case of the Army's cultural mission, it is fur-
thermore generally suggested that the overarching goal was to Americanize
Germany, though it is acknowledged that even in this the military were not
nearly as effective as such informal instruments as Hollywood movies, corporate
advertisers, and rock music would be in the 1950s and '60s. In effect, "the
period of the Occupation," though "marked by economic colonization, cul-
tural imperialism, and the re-education program, was [in reality] a prologue to
a more developed Americanization. Chewing gum and Lucky Strike . . . were
the harbingers of McDonalds." Bringing these two lines of analysis together,
Marion Deshmukh attributes the deficiencies in cultural policy administration
to the reluctance of the Americans to take art seriously. In fact, she suggests
that because the Americans saw art merely as entertainment they adopted a
"passive" cultural policy position.10
9. Ulrich Bausch, Die Kuhurpolitik der US-amerikanischen Information Control Division in
Wiirttemberg-Baden von 1945 bis 1949 (Stuttgart, 1992); Norbert Frei, Amerikanische Lizenzpolitik
und deutsche Pressetmdition: Die Geschichte der Nachkriegszeitung Sudost-Kurier (Munich, 1986); a wel-
come and rare English-language example is Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, "Art is Democracy and
Democracy is Art: Culture, Propaganda and the Neue Zeitung in Germany, 1944-1947," Diplomatic
History 23, no. 1 (1999): 21-43, though she distinguishes between American-born ICD officers
(who she thinks did not understand the local situation) and the German-born ones (who she
believes did).
10. Edward Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit, 1977), 349,
351; Wolfgang Schivelbusch, In a Cold Crater: Cultural and Intellectual Life in Berlin, 1 945-48
(Berkeley, 1998), 28; Richard Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated and Transformed
American Culture Since WWII (New York, 1997), 40—46 similarly presents American cultural officials
as insensitive to European conditions and determined on Americanizing Germany. The final quote
is from Ralph Willett, The Americanization of Germany, 1945-1949 (London, 1989), 14; Peter K.
Breit, also emphasizes the failure of official efforts at "Americanization" in comparison to the
success of U.S. popular culture in the 1950s: "Culture as Authority: American and German
Transactions," in The American Impact on Postwar Germany, ed. Pommerin, 125—48. Marion Desh-
mukh, "Recovering Culture: The Berlin National Gallery and the U.S. Occupation, 1945—49,"
Central European History 27, no. 4 (1994): 418-19.
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Much can certainly be said in support of this perspective, but in some criti-
cal respects it misrepresents the work of the cultural officers. In the case of art
music, the promotion of American culture became a dominant element in the
military government's work only in the summer of 1947. At this point the gath-
ering conflict with the Soviets led to a new emphasis on visiting American
artists, German-U.S. cultural exchanges, and expositions through the network
of Amerika Hauser (Information Centers). Until that time, local MG officials
were allowed to choose their own path to the cultural goals established by the
Information Control's executive. And ICD's terms of reference were very broad
indeed: "to guide and control the reconstruction of German theater and music."
Certain musical works were banned outright — such as military marches and
songs associated with the Wehrmacht or Nazi Party — but in all other cases,
censorship was "at the discretion of the local music officer." Similarly, initial
directives specified only that no composer, performer, or producer "who has
been a notorious Nazi or an ardent Nazi sympathizer" could appear in a pre-
sentation or "otherwise take part in any musical activity." In terms of positive
policy, ICD was equally vague. The main endeavor was simply "to introduce
or reintroduce the German public to the large musical world from which they
had been barred under Nazi rule." At the very least, this meant the recovery
of works by Jewish and Allied-nations' composers as well as the return to the
concert halls of works by modern Germans whom the Nazis had labeled
"degenerate." But ICD went further, suggesting — and this seems rather strange
in retrospect — that even performances of "lesser-known works by famous
German composers, which had not been accepted as part of the Nazi canon
of German national culture, such as Haydn's symphonies, Mozart's piano con-
certos, [and] Schubert's chamber music, was [sic] likewise to be encouraged."
While these directives certainly did not prohibit the promotion of American
music culture, they nowhere stipulated it as a particular goal.11
But the openness of ICD directives to local interpretation was not a sign of
passivity; rather it had much to do with the Americans' respect for German
music traditions as they understood them. For the Germans, the cultural officers
asserted, casting a sideways glance at the United States, music, "far from being a
luxury . . . has always been an essential element in . . . cultural and everyday life.
Probably the greatest musicians in the world have grown from the rich back-
ground of German traditions." Moreover, "as Schiller said, the theater is a
moralische Anstalt, or moral institution, where men can see presented the basic
principles of life. The Germans recognize this." And, through their artistry, they
had, in the past, made it manifest. In order to restore this rich cultural tradition,
11. History: Information Control Division, Office of the Military Government for Germany
(U.S.), 8 May 1945-30 June 1946, 68-69, OMGUS, Records of the Executive Office, Information
Control Division, Box 454. Bausch also notes the flexibility of ICD directives in Die Kulturpolitik
der US, 174-77.
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ICD officials initially — and this placed them in harmony with MGs policy
of German regional self-governance — argued in favor of decentralization.
Germany's great musical tradition, it was argued, lay in "the development of
small states . . . [with] wealthy and independent sovereigns [who] promoted an
elaborate theatrical and musical culture . . . as a way of presenting the cultural
achievements of their principalities to the outside world." Reconstruction and
reeducation might therefore be merged into one: decentralizing the arts would
both reawaken Germany's cultural greatness while at the same time undermin-
ing the chauvinism and militarism that were identified with the nation state.
Consequently, American cultural officers saw a restoration of municipal and
Land (state) authority over the arts as preferable to privatization, arguing that "it
would be inconceivable to a German to go without his municipal theater." The
Theater and Music Control Office's main job, then, as ICD defined it, lay in
returning German art to its pre-Nazi state while at the same time "teaching"
the German people "about the musical world outside" so as to reverse "the
constant drilling received from Goebbels that musical culture could progress
and survive only in Germany."12
The first months of the occupation, therefore, saw the music officers pre-
occupied with the purging of former Nazis from the major institutions and
the supervision of the resumption of municipally and state-subsidized concert
life. Unfortunately, in Bavaria at least, these two directives were to prove an un-
comfortable fit. According to PWD orders, concertizing, which had been pro-
hibited during the first few weeks of the occupation, was to be allowed to
resume where it was judged, for morale or propagandistic purposes, "a mili-
tary necessity"; at the same time, the musical organizations were to be sifted
for Nazis, and only after being "cleansed" were they to be authorized to re-
sume "normal" operations under military government license. This two-phase
policy embodied twin goals. Over the long run, PWD insisted that exposure to
music prohibited during the Third Reich would have a "re-educational and
therapeutic value"; but in the short term, it would also "bring relief from the
squalor and misery [of postwar life] and act as a 'safety-valve,' thus aiding the
task of the occupation." In other words, while the overall ambition was to pull
"a few solid non-Nazi bricks from the mass of rubble and with them [begin]
to build up a new musical structure in Bavaria," the immediate concern was to
get music back into people's lives. The trouble was that for music to be used as
12. John Evarts, Special Report: Music Control in Bavaria, June 1945-July 1946, 27 June 1946,
OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division Records, Theater and Music Section, Box
241; Theater and Music Accomplishments (n.d.), (emphasis in original), OMGUS, Records of the
Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Records of the Cultural Affairs Branch, General
Records, Box 248; History of Information Control Division, Office of the Military Government for
Germany (U.S.), 8 May 1945-30 June 1946, OMGUS, Records of the Executive Office,
Information Control Division, Box 454.
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a psychological tool it would have to be good; and this might prove difficult
because most of the "great artists had been more or less affiliated with the Nazi
regime."13
Regrettably, Bavaria's first music officers ignored the fact that they had
entered an undrained basin and advanced decisively into the muck. The Land's
first chief of the Theatre and Music Branch, Harry Bogner, had been a
Milwaukee architect until his recruitment by OWI in January 1945. He proved
a jovial dilettante, preoccupied with meeting famous artists, ingratiating him-
self with them, and collecting autographs. He told Munich's Ministerialrat
Metzger that the Americans had no desire to "meddle in theater and music life,
but merely to exercise supervision over the organizational and political side . . .
and to ban overtly Nazi works and reinstate previously prohibited pieces." He
was even rash enough to tell Munich's mayor Schattenhofer that he did not
expect musicians connected to the NSDAP to be removed from their posts.
Determined on hearing music sound among the ruins, Bogner, in early July
1945, authorized the Munich Philharmonic to begin offering weekly concerts
in the bomb-damaged Prinzregenten Theater. And though he was acting in this
regard in accordance with official PWD/ICD policy, there can be no doubt that
in his desire to be the first to free himself of the traces, he had moved too soon.14
The great problem, of course, lay in what to have performed and who would
play it. Scores and parts for two previously banned works — Mendelssohn's
Midsummer Night's Dream and Tchaikovsky's Fourth Symphony — were
secured, thus fulfilling one part of the section's objective. But finding a con-
ductor was less easy. Clemens Krauss, the Opera director, had long fled the city
and the Philharmonic's maestro, Oswald Kabasta, had been relieved of his post
as a "borderline case": not a Parteigenosse (party member) perhaps, but a
Parteianwdrter (applicant for membership). Edward Kilenyi, one of Bavaria's new
music officers, while acknowledging Kabasta s musicianship, felt it was impossi-
13. Directive for Psychological Warfare and Control of German Information Services 18 April
1945, Special Staff— Psychological Warfare Division, Entry 87, Box 19 NA, GG 331 SHAEFJohn
Evarts, Special Report: Music Control in Bavaria, June 1945-July 1946, 27 June 1946, OMGUS,
Educational and Cultural Relations Division Records, Theater and Music Section, Box 241;
Reorientation Activities of ODIC in Germany, 15 April 1947, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural
Relations Division, Cultural Affairs Branch, General Records, Box 248.
14. W. Bogner, Jr., "Harry Bogner: Biographical Sketch," n.d., copy in author's possession;
H. Hagen, Personal Observations of Operations in 6870th DISCC, 29 September 1945, OMGUS,
Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Theater and Music Section, Box 241; interview with
E. Kilenyi, 28 June 1995; memo: Meinzolt, 3 July 1945, Akten des Bayerisches Ministerium fur
Unterricht und Kultus, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (hereafter BHstA), MK50007; the conversa-
tion with Schattenhofer concerned Oswald Kabasta: Gabriele Meyer, "Oswald Kabasta und die
Miinchner Philharmoniker: Glanzvolle Karriere unter dem Hakenkreuz und bitteres Ende," in
Musik soil nicht bloss tonen, sie muss leben: Die Beitrdge zum 2. Internationalen Oswald Kabasta Symposion,
ed. E. Exl (Graz, 1998), 161; D. Taylor memo to Film-Theater-Music Control Branches, 26 May
1945, NA, GG331, SHAEF, Special Staff— Psychological Warfare Division, Entry 87, Box 24.
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ble to allow a leading artist to occupy "the same position under American con-
trol which he held under the Nazis"; at least until "extensive investigation" had
cleared him. So the Branch turned to another Bavarian conductor, Eugen
Jochum, the "energetic and successful" Generalmusikdirector of the Hamburg
Philharmonic, who had returned to his family's Munich home in the last days
of the war. For the second concert, the Americans secured Hans Knapperts-
busch, the "idol of Bavaria" and a man who, the music officers believed on the
basis of informal intelligence, had remained "comparatively clean under the
Nazis." The orchestra that performed in these opening concerts was cobbled
together from available musicians, but conformed roughly to its contours dur-
ing the Third Reich.15
The concerts, though of unflaggingly modest quality, were received with
great enthusiasm by capacity audiences that interpreted them, logically enough,
as evidence of the occupation's leniency. The impression did not last. On 7 July
1945, the day before the Philharmonic's opening concert, MG finally brought
down its mandatory removal list that prohibited the employment of Nazi Party
members or those who had profited from the regime in the public sector,
including state-controlled orchestras and theaters.16 Fearful for his position,
Jochum promptly returned to Hamburg and the leniency of British zonal
administration. In the third week of July, the assistant conductor of the Munich
Philharmonic was dismissed for having been an SS member and nineteen mem-
bers of his orchestra as well as 40 percent of the Staatsoper Orchestra lost their
jobs. With only two concerts behind them, the Philharmonic was forced to sus-
pend performances when its license was temporarily revoked. Knappertsbusch,
whose name did not appear on the blacklist, moved over to the Staatsoper and
was named director. And then, unexpectedly, in late October 1945, his case too
was reviewed and he was declared unfit to perform because of his collabora-
15. H. Hagen, Report on Mission to Munich and Nurnberg, 29 September 1945, OMGUS,
Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Theater and Music Section, Box 241; on his
Fragebogen (questionnaire), Kabasta indicated that he had applied for party membership in 1938, but
had never received a membership card. The Americans initially accepted this, but by November
1945 they had found not only his 1938 membership number, but also evidence to suggest that he
had joined the party in Austria six years before. Kabasta continued to deny his official membership
in the party (whether dated 1932 or 1938) and, in despair, committed suicide in February 1946; for
more see Meyer, "Oswald Kabasta und die Miinchner Philharmoniker," 161—65 (I am indebted to
Joan Evans for this reference). A. Vogel, Daily Reports, 26 June 1945, 25 June 1945, 10 July 1945.
A. Vogel, Daily Reports, 26 June 1945, 25 June 1945, 10 July 1945, OMGUS, Educational and
Cultural Relations Division, Administrative Records of the Director's Office, Box 20, Music
Section.
16. Lutz Niethammer, Entnazijizierung in Bayern: Sduberung und Rehabilitierung unter amerikani-
scher Besatzung (Frankfurt am Main, 1972), 149-56.
17. Music Section, Daily Report, 15 July 1945, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Affairs
Division, Educational and Cultural Relations Branch, Administrative Records of the Director's
Office, Box 20;J. Evarts, Special Report: Music Control in Bavariajune 1945 to July 1946, 27 June
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By then, Harry Bogner had returned to the United States amid charges of
"gross inefficiency" and Arthur Vogel, the genial music section chief, had fol-
lowed in late August 1945, leaving his successor, Edward Kilenyi, a brilliant but
self-effacing Hungarian-American pianist, to restore some authority to the
army's music work in Bavaria. It was not an easy task. Despite protests that the
"wholesale dismissals" were having a "paralyzing effect... on musical life" and
that it made little sense to remove a second violinist on the grounds that he was
"an incumbent of public office" and hence a political threat, there was, in fact,
little that could be done. Kilenyi considered the situation "acutely embarrassing
for this organization. After having encouraged them with their first concerts, we
are now forced to castrate and behead the body." The Knappertsbusch case, in
particular, "had a very unfortunate effect on the Germans," for he had not only
been hired to conduct the Philharmonic, he had also performed, with Kilenyi
as soloist, in a special concert for American military personnel. His blacklisting
had therefore served particularly to "undermine their [the German public's]
confidence in the validity of our licenses and appointments."18
Doubtless, the music officers should have waited until the murky situation
had been clarified before committing themselves to reviving musical activity,
especially on so large and so public a scale. Though the source of the problem
clearly lay elsewhere — in uncertain and contradictory initial policy direc-
tives — the music officers had themselves made the choice in the first two
months of the occupation to emphasize the revitalization rather than the cleans-
ing of music's arteries. For men who had been music lovers, musicians and arts
administrators in private life, the decision undoubtedly made sense: after all, they
tended to accept (in all cases but those Vogel termed "outright stinkers"), the
prevailing orthodoxy that music was unpolitical and that among artists "there
was little incidence between personal politics and professional ability."19 Theirs
had not, then, been an unreasoned error, but it was one that would have a per-
manent and costly effect on the music branch's activities and credibility.
In the wake of the debacle of denazification, the section was forced to reori-
ent its activities. In mid-July 1945 it adopted, on its own initiative, the method
already pioneered by the Russians in Berlin, and established German-run
Kulturdmter (cultural offices) in Nuremberg, Regensburg, and Munich. The
1946, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Theater and Music Section, Box 241;
Aktennotiz attn. Staatliches Wohnungsamt, 2 August 1945 BHstA, MK 50187; Die Neue Zeitung,
25 October 1945.
18. H. Hagen, Personal Observations of Operations in 6870th DISCC, 29 September 1945,
OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Theater and Music Branch, Box 241; Music
Section, Daily Reports, 15 July and 5 August 1945; Music Section, Weekly Report, 3 November
1945, OMGUS, Education and Cultural Relations Division, Administrative Records of the
Director's Office, Box 20.
19. ICD History, 8 May 1945-30 June 1946, 62, OMGUS, Records of the Executive Office
ICD: Activities, 1945-49, Box 454.
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music divisions of these agencies — the Arbeitsausschiisse fur musikalische
Berufsfragen (working committee on questions relating to professional musi-
cians) — were charged with "interrogating" applicants for jobs and licenses,
aiding musicians in the completion of their Fragebogen and acting as a liaison
between the artistic community and MG. By transferring authority over the
interview and information process, and by reserving to itself only the final rec-
ommendation regarding the issuance of licenses, the branch officers extracted
themselves from much of the time-consuming contention that bogged down
the business of issuing work permits. In the meantime, Kilenyi and his new
assistant, John Evarts, a personable and energetic former music teacher at Black
Mountain College, began to focus more clearly on MG designs regarding the
place of music in German reeducation. They did this by "concentrating] more
on qualitative matters than on denazification [or] control."20
By taste and temperament, Kilenyi was a Central European. Though born in
Philadelphia, he had been educated in the nineteenth-century European clas-
sics, trained at the Liszt Academy in Budapest, and he made his debut in
Brussels. His father, an eminent music pedagogue and George Gershwin's
teacher, had conscientiously directed his son "away from American music, very
much away from it." As a result, Kilenyi not only had no American music in his
own repertoire, but also believed that "there wasn't so much of it to know."
Evarts, while significantly more knowledgeable, had the good taste to be a dis-
criminating booster; his own preferences in contemporary music ran to
Stravinsky, Hindemith and, especially, the French moderns. In a speech he gave
"a hundred times" to different school groups and music societies, he spoke
candidly about the strengths and weaknesses of American art music. There
was, he explained, no great American opera, and the few decent works that had
been performed would not really survive in the repertoire; similarly, there was
no major American symphony, and no real American style. He apparently
"caused extreme amazement" among audiences with his opinion that there
were only three outstanding opera companies in the entire United States. And
he spoke favorably about the German system of state-subsidized theater.
Although part of the U.S. educational mission was to "counteract the deeply
20. H. Hagen, Report on Mission to Munich and Nurnberg, 29 September 1945, OMGUS,
Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Theater and Music Section, Box 241; John Evarts,
Yearly Report of Music Control in Bavaria—July 1946—July 1947, Educational and Cultural
Relations Division, Theater and Music Branch, Weekly Reports, Box 239. Claus-Dieter Schwab, in
his study of 1CD Munich, criticizes the Americans for their preoccupation with denazification and
control; see "Kultur zwischen Kontrolle und kleiner Freiheit: Amerikanische Kulturpolitik in
Miinchen am Beispiel der Information Control Division," in Triimmerzeit in Munchen, ed. Friedrich
Prinz (Munich, 1984), 67-68. His point is valid for some sections under ICD control, but as Prinz
notes, one needs to consider military government activity section by section and group by group;
Prinz, "Miinchner Kultur — Kultur in Munchen, 1945/49: Nature Morte oder Musica Viva," in
Prinz, Triimmerzeit, 14.
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rooted misconception that the United States is a purely materialistic power with
no cultural life of its own," a view a State Department survey in 1949 ruefully
reported that is "shared by most Europeans, including some of our recent
Allies," the officers of the music branch helped to perpetuate the image they
were charged with altering.21
But if Evarts and Kilenyi were reluctant promoters of American music, they
did show, if only by example, that military administrators could still be inspired
artists and deeply musical people. This went a long way, as did the fact that both
officers were generally well liked by the Germans with whom they dealt.
Moreover, under Evarts' direction — he succeeded Kilenyi as chief music
officer when the latter returned to the U.S. in April 1946 — the branch was at
last able to narrow the defining parameters of its work. To Evarts and Kilenyi,
the primary goal was "to raise the musical standards of Bavaria from a level of
narrow chauvinism and conservatism to one of greater inclusiveness and in-
ternational scope." Instead of concentrating narrowly on American music,
the section promoted a salmagundi of twentieth-century European master-
works, securing scores and parts for pieces by Webern, Martin, Hindemith,
Shostakovich, Bartok, and Ravel. In fact, the first orchestral work by an
American to be performed in postwar Munich was not heard until late January
1947.22 There was, then, no effort made to force American art on the Germans;
instead, the music officers seemed content to encourage artists to perform pieces
by contemporary European composers and to do what they could to make
those concerts possible. This involved, primarily, securing recordings that would
allow works to be heard, ordering scores and arranging international contacts.
More significantly, it involved reversing the direction of initial policy and
instead of promoting the revival of local organizations and the rehabilitation of
local artists, the music officers began pressuring the state's cultural institutions
into adopting a more international perspective.23
In Evarts's mind, encouraging exposure to exogenous culture was the best
way of attacking the nationalism and chauvinism that he, like most of his peers,
21. Author's interview with Edward Kilenyi, 8 June 1996; J. Evarts, "Vom Musikleben in
Amerika," Neue Musik 3, no. 1 (February 1947): 80-85; J. Evarts, weekly Report, 16 November
1946, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Theatre and Music Branch, Weekly
Reports, Box 239; Report to the State Department of the USIE Survey Mission on the OMGUS
Reorientation Program in Germany, 21 July 1949, NA, RG 59, Lot 53D311, Box 205. Bausch also
notes the European connections of many ICD officers and sees them as having a "double-iden-
tification" in Kulturpolitik der US, 159 and conclusion. See also Gienow-Hecht, "Art is Democracy
and Democracy is Art," 24-29.
22. John Evarts, Yearly Report of Music Control in Bavaria —July 1946-July 1947 and Weekly
Report, 11 January 1947, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Theater and
Music Branch, Weekly Reports, Box 239.
23. A similar policy is emphasized by Thomas Steiert in an excellent article on music control in
Stuttgart: "Zur Musik und Theaterpolitik in Stuttgart wahrend der amerikanischen Besatzungszeit,"
in Kulturpolitik im besetzten Deutschland, 1945-1949, ed. Gabriele Clemens (Stuttgart, 1994), 55-68.
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saw at the root of National Socialism. Convinced that "for the last twelve years
Germany lived in isolation from the rest of the world," the music officers set
themselves the task of "introducing] an international point of view in the tra-
ditionally nationalistic conception of culture held by Germany." Happily, this
form of internationalization was also a type of Americanism, for as Evarts
explained, an openness to the music of other nations was the primary charac-
teristic of American high culture. The enormous energy coursing through
American musical life, he asserted, was a product of stylistic cross-fertilization:
"America has opened its doors to music from around the world, and extraordi-
narily vital work is resulting." Interestingly enough, cultural integration and
Germany's reassimilation into European art was already fixed as a goal of
OMGBavaria's music section by early 1946, a year before it would be specified
as one of the central aims of U.S. occupation policy in the July 1947 revisions
to MG's charter document,JCS 1067.24
The section's determination to promote contemporary, as opposed to nar-
rowly American, art was nowhere more evident than in its dealings with
Bavaria's leading musical personalities. The darling of the section was Karl
Amadeus Hartmann, an enthusiastic promoter of the new, a composer of
remorselessly grim music, and a man who seemed genuinely open to sugges-
tions. Hartmann was the leading local example of the inner emigrant: during
the Third Reich he had refused to allow performances of his works and had
survived through the kindness of his wife's family, something that stood him in
good stead among the occupation forces. With the help of the section, he was
able to found a new music society in Munich, organize a contemporary music
festival, head the Arbeitsausschuss (working committee), and act as coordinator
for a number of MG-sponsored events and organizations. "Of all the musical
people in Munich who deserve support from his fellow citizens," wrote John
Evarts gratefully, "Hartmann deserves it as much as any." Unfortunately, his
music was not much liked by the Bavarian public, and his efforts on behalf of
new music were scrupulously ignored. For local audiences, there was only one
great modern composer in Munich, and that was Carl Orff. "There is an OrfF
cult around Munich with 'oh's' and 'ah's' about its hero at the drop of a hat,"
John Evarts snarled: "they connect him with Stravinsky and speak of him open-
ing new paths." Needless to say, "he composed throughout the Nazi regime."
The music section actually held Orff in decidedly low esteem; as Evarts
observed, he "takes a perfectly pleasant musical phrase, orchestrates it neatly and
then repeats it forty-five times, until some of the listeners are ready to throw
24. J. Evarts, "Vom Musikleben in Amerika," 85; Report to the Department of State of the
USIE Survey Mission on the OMGUS Reorientation Program in Germany, 21 July 1949, RG
59, Lot 53D311, Box 205. The text of JCS 1779, which replaced JCS 1067, can be found
in U.S. Department of State, Germany, 1947—49: The Story in Documents (Washington, 1950), 33—41.
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things." But it was not so much his activities under the Nazis, nor the manner
of his music that made him so unpopular among the cultural officers; it was his
self-proclaimed Bavarianness. The section was suspicious of his contacts with
conservative Catholic politicians in the CSU and it regarded his vernacular
Sprechoper, Die Bernauerin, which was premiered in July 1946, with deep disfa-
vor. As Evarts sourly remarked of the work: "the occasional bright spots do not
add up to anything really impressive nor make up for the essential poverty of
musical or dramatic content." It was, he asserted, a "specious and static" work
and he despaired over the talk of it becoming "Munich's own . . . traditional
piece which will be given. . . each year, ritual fashion, like Parsifal in
Bayreuth."25
Other local favorites received similar treatment. Professor Hans Ludwig
Held, the city's Kuhurbeauftragter (cultural administrator), was dismissed as "cho-
leric and much too ardently Bavarian, though he pretends to a broad, inter-
national outlook." The conductor Eugen Jochum was also now caustically
dismissed as too local in his musical associations; "he's very smooth, very smil-
ing, very friendly, and known to be very Catholic," Evarts noted. Even
Knappertsbusch, whose blacklisting had been the cause of such embarrassment,
was now regarded as too Bavarian by half. As Arthur Vogel explained, he was
difficult to work with because "the same independence of character and pride"
that had kept him at arms length from the Nazis also made him "reluctant to
give up even a small part of his Teutonic, heavily Wagnerian bias."26
What the Americans actually meant by Bavarian is not entirely clear.
Certainly Evarts, who had spent much time in Germany before the war, had
earlier rhapsodized about the Bavarians' "enjoyment [of life], their composed,
healthy outlook, the gemiitlich [sic] atmosphere." In fact, he thought Munich
"the best place in Europe." Of course, that had been before the Nazis, the
bombings, active service, and the occupation. The Bavaria of the rubble years
was an emotionally turbulent place and what the cultural officers now con-
fronted was bureaucratic resistance, administrative arrogance, public disdain for
America, and a strongly parochial desire on the part of those in authority to
support friends and political supporters. Bavarian came to imply an outward
amiability cloaking inner opposition. It came to mean hostility to cultural inte-
gration into modern Europe, it came to suggest a desire to return to prewar
conditions, it came to signify restoration rather than reeducation. For the
largely Protestant music officers, Bavarian also now carried with it culturally-
25. J. Evarts, "Diary: Spring-Summer 1947," 7-8 (copy in author's possession); J. Evarts, Semi-
monthly summary, 16 July 1946, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Affairs Division, Educational
and Cultural Relations Branch, Administrative Records of the Director's Office, Box 20.
26. J. Evarts, "Diary: Spring-Summer 1947," 4 and 6; A. Vogel, Daily Report, 25 June 1945,
OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Administrative Records of the Director's
Office, Box 20.
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inherited suspicions of conspiratorial Catholicism. In reality, then, Bavarian
came to mean resistance against and independence from American control. And
this was probably no surprise, for increasingly, in defending their noncompli-
ance with occupation policies, the Germans with whom the Americans dealt
were insisting on the importance of protecting damaged local traditions.
Bavarian thus became a focal point of conflict, with the music officers instinc-
tively opposing anything with local ties and the German authorities and public
increasingly favoring those with strong parochial connections.27
If the music officers were to fulfill their mission, the challenge was to find
performers and composers whose local connections did not block their recep-
tiveness to contemporary, non-German music. And in this effort they had, para-
doxically, Munich's Nazi past on their side. Thanks to the elevated position the
city had attained in the cultural life of the fascist state, it was a prized catch for
any musician — all the more so because the only German city whose star out-
shone its own, Berlin, had been so effectively reduced and so dangerously
divided.28 As a result, Munich's major orchestras had their pick of conductors,
even if precious few of the good ones were "white" enough to perform.
Fortuitously, the end of the war found Hans Rosbaud in nearby Stuttgart and
on a recommendation from Knappertsbusch, he was brought in to conduct the
newly reconstituted Philharmonic late in October 1945. Rosbaud was a lucky
find: he had neither been a party member, nor had he been prominent enough,
like Furtwangler or Knappertsbusch, to have attracted much attention to him-
self; consequently, "with the blacklisting of practically every prominent German
musician," he remained "the one really good white conductor in the American
zone and hence a musical plum." Even more happily, he was known to be a
friend of Stravinsky, Schoenberg, Webern, and Hindemith, and an ardent pro-
moter of contemporary music. As one cultural officer recalled, "Rosbaud . . .
was a really great musician and tremendously interested in contemporary
music . . . I mean Rosbaud was right and with it."29
27. Evarts Private Archive.J. Evarts, "Diary of second European tour 1929." A similar pattern of
development is described in James Tent's definitive study of U.S. education policy Mission on the
Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany (Chicago, 1982), esp. chap. 4.
Bausch sees a similar struggle against pietistic Protestantism in Wiirttemberg-Baden; Die Kukur-
politik der US, 129-35.
28. On Nazi-period Munich see David Clay Large, Where Ghosts Walked: Munich's Road to the
Third Reich (New York, 1997), esp. 258-67;
29. Suddeutsche Zeitung, 26 October 1945; A. Vogel, Daily Report, 9 July 1945, OMGUS,
Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Administrative Records of the Director's Office, Box
20; History of Theater and Music Control Branch: Wuerttemberg-Baden, 5, NA, RG 260, OMG
Wuerttemberg-Baden, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Records of the Cultural Affairs
Branch, Records Relating to Music and Theater, Box 242; on Rosbaud's career see: Joan Evans,
Hans Rosbaud: A Bio-Bibliography (New York, 1992), 13—40 and for an assessment that undermines
the Americans' opinion that Rosbaud was "truly white," Michael Kater, The Twisted Muse: Musicians
and their Music in the Third Reich (New York, 1997), 65-69; author's interview with Carlos Moseley,
18 March 1996.
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With the problem of the Philharmonic apparently satisfactorily resolved by
Rosbaud's appointment as music director in mid-November 1945, the music
officers turned their attention to the Opera. Here the issues were even more
serious and a succession of weak conductors had to fill the breach until
Ferdinand Leitner, a sharp young Kapellmeister, was secured from Hamburg in
early 1946. Leitner, however, while viewed as a competent administrator, was
never seriously considered for the post of music director. Still, at a time when
logistics proved to be a considerable problem, Leitner was a major asset. The
great difficulty for the Opera, at least in the beginning, was not the promotion
of new music, but simply the production of anything. Operas require costumes,
sets, decorations, and multiple vocal scores, and as late as December 1945, of the
eighty-four works in the Staatsoper's prewar repertoire, only four were per-
formable. To compensate, the Opera orchestra filled the gaps in the season with
concerts, and many of these now featured works by contemporary composers
like Schoenberg, Krenek, Stravinsky, and Poulenc. All of the interim con-
ductors dutifully participated in these concerts. In the meantime, because
Knappertsbusch's return to the podium was impossible, the Opera's state-
appointed Intendant (chief artistic administrator), began negotiations with
Jochum, who, it was agreed, would apply for denazification, something the cul-
tural officers — who were interested in blocking Bavarian candidates — now
greatly opposed and looked for ways to forestall.30
The breakthrough for the Americans came over Christmas 1945 thanks to a
chance meeting in Switzerland between one of Munich's theater officers and
Georg Sold, a young Hungarian pianist and conductor-in-training. Solti had
known Kilenyi during his student years in Budapest, and though he had hardly
ever conducted an opera, Kilenyi ordered the Intendant to "give him a trial"
in one performance of Fidelio. His debut that summer was an electrifying sen-
sation. Evarts observed that "the improvement in playing of the orchestra was
little short of miraculous. Mr. Solti himself said that with only two rehearsals it
was practically improvised, implying he could have made a much better job of
it." Even the Intendant was momentarily exhilarated and enthused to Evarts that,
after searching so long for a music director, "this is our man." Solti was imme-
diately hired on a two-year contract as Musikleiter (music director), much to the
chagrin of ministry and city officials who had confidently predicted Jochum's
imminent denazification. For the Americans, however, the new conductor was
an undoubted treasure — a Jew, a non-Bavarian, and an explosive talent. But he
also had the disadvantage of youth and inexperience, and while not unwilling
30. Suddeutsche Zeitung, 17 September 1946; A. Bauckner, Spielplan, 1946, 19 December 1945
BHstA, MK 50239; A. Bauckner, monthly reports for December 1945, February-March 1946, and
May 1946, BHstA, MK 50239; K. Scharnagl to Staatsrmmster, 15 February 1947, BHstA, MK
50187.
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to try the occasional modern work, he was building his own repertoire in
Munich and gravitated to the pre-WWI classics.31
Still, in the summer of 1946 the Americans were feeling pretty satisfied with
their achievements. Musical activity in Bavaria had "steadily progressed . . .
more agents have been licensed, more halls made available, more orchestras
formed and more musicians cleared." Beyond Munich, symphony orchestras
had been authorized in Nuremberg, Bamberg, Bayreuth, Hof, Wiirzburg, and
Dachau and opera companies had been licensed in Regensburg, Coburg,
Augsburg, and Nuremberg. The summer following the end of the war saw an
average of ten concerts and recitals in Munich per week. Though the section
officers had failed to prevent the dismissal from the orchestras of former party
members, it had worked out a compromise whereby works of blacklisted com-
posers could still be performed, so long as "no special honors [were] paid to
them." The two most pressing concerns, the conductor-vacancies in Munich,
had now been resolved through the direct intervention of the section. Further,
the Americans had developed a small coterie of loyal German contacts —
people like Karl Amadeus Hartmann, Hans Rosbaud, Ferdinand Leitner, the
great singer of the younger generation, Hans Hotter, and a great singer of the
past, Paul Bender, as well as Wolfgang Jacobi at the Musikhochschule (Con-
servatory) — these were all individuals who were willing to advance the goals
of the occupation and participate in American-sponsored organizations. More-
over, new European music and formerly banned classical works were now being
heard in Bavaria, and this, Evarts pronounced, was "providing] a healing
antidote to the years of militarism, hate and suppression . . . As a universal lan-
guage . . . [music is] a positive force and it has already contributed to the build-
ing of better morale among the Bavarians — a morale based upon something
more lasting than Nazi ideology."32
Four months later it all began to unravel. American authority in the first year
of the occupation was victory's handiwork. While no members of the music
branch ever resorted to force to ensure compliance with their wishes, the threat
was always there. This threat was a reality for the Germans in 1945—1946, but
it was unacknowledged by the section officers who were proud of the decency
and respect they showed the defeated. As Evarts explained it, he believed his job
was to act as a "liaison between Americans and Germans and vice versa." This
31. Author's interview with Edward Kilenyi, 8 June 1996; in his Memoirs (New York, 1997) and
in an interview with the author, 16 March 1997, Sold maintained that he was only invited to per-
form in Munich after he had successfully conducted in Stuttgart on 26 April 1946. Bauckner, how-
ever, had already engaged him, "at the request of the military government," to perform in Fidelio
by late March: A. Bauckner to Staatsministerium, 25 March 1946, BHstA, MK 50204; J. Evarts,
Weekly Report, 29 June 1946; K. Scharnagl to Staatsminister, 15 February 1947 and E.Jochum to
A. Hundhammer, 23 July 1947, BHstA, MK 50187.
32. J. Evarts, Special Report — Music Control in Bavaria—June 1945 to July 1946, 27 June
1946, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Theater and Music Branch, Box 241.
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self-image grew out of the section officers' sense of themselves as artists first,
and their belief that music was above politics. Our aim, wrote Evarts with
painful naivety, "has been towards having the best available people in the key
positions, as far as possible removed from political considerations."33 The nar-
row definition of politics on which this statement was based; the benevolence
that officers like Evarts saw in their own actions; the sense that they were
protecting the rich traditions of European music culture from the crudity of
military rule, were views not shared by most Germans. For the occupied, the
music officers were embodiments of national humiliation: unimportant college
teachers, mid-western architects, narrow-minded bureaucrats, and second-rate
performers who were presuming to order about the greatest artists and pass
judgment on the finest music that Germany might produce. Moreover, they
were Americans, a people most Germans considered utterly devoid of cultural
or aesthetic sensibilities. Consequently, even though the section may have made
artistically defensible and politically sensitive decisions — after all, Rosbaud and
Solti were fine conductors and the encouragement of contemporary European
works did contribute to Munich's emergence as a center for modern and exper-
imental art — their intrusions into the field of cultural promotion and man-
agement were viewed as particularly galling reminders of defeat. Resistance in
this context was inevitable, understandable, perhaps laudable, and increasingly
vicious.
It would, however, have smoldered in unvoiced containment had the military
government not released it. For the music section, this happened early in
October 1946 when the bayonets were withdrawn and the forceful advance of
reorientation policies shattered. The cause lay in a major shift in the direction
of the occupation following Secretary of State Byrnes's seminal 6 September
address to MG personnel in Stuttgart. In the speech, Byrnes had suggested that
there must be a rapid return to German self-government and emphasized that
reeducation would be achieved by tutelage and example rather than by control.
For the music section, the new direction unfortunately first assumed form at the
moment when it was trying to install one of its own in the powerful position
of Staatsoper Intendant (chief artistic administrator of the State Opera). The
Americans had appointed the first Intendant in the summer of 1945, but they
soon found him unsatisfactory and were now pressing for his removal. In his
place, they were pushing Ferdinand Leitner — one of their closer contacts —
and a man who seemed at the time to be getting along exceptionally well with
Solti. But at a crucial meeting with the Kultusminister (Minister of Education),
the chief of the Information Control Division in Bavaria now sounded the
retreat: "in matters of State positions in Theater and Music," he announced,
"ICD would simply clear the people politically and the entire choice otherwise
33. J. Evarts, "Diary: September 1946," 6.
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would be in the hands of the Kultusminister and his Referenten (advisors)." Evarts,
who was at the meeting, was understandably furious: ICD's "wishy washy
behavior," he stormed, had "removed our power of control virtually at the high
point of conflict, making us look like ineffective school-boys."34 It would prove
a watershed.
Resistance to the occupation needed a grounding — a moral and political
legitimacy — if it was to be anything but childish. The absence of a German
nation made opposition on this basis difficult and rendered existing strains
of Bavarian provincialism all the more potent. Overt nationalism might be
unthinkable in prostrate, divided Germany, but regionalism was not. This was
the safe, localized Germany the Americans had initially promoted as an alter-
native to the nation state, and it now turned on them with a vengeance.
Kultusminister Fendt, for example, in explaining his opposition to Leitner's
appointment, declared that the musician would be a poor choice because "he
did not come from Bavaria" and would not "in Bavarian political circles [be
seen] as a good appointee." In further discussion with Evarts and his section
chief, Fendt stressed the "political aspects of the appointment" and, with an eye
on Bavaria's first postwar Land election just six weeks away, his "duties to the
Volk." Evarts noted that he now found "political and chauvinistic considerations
are of prime importance" and he urged ICD to restore his authority so that
"individuals chosen for important posts should be selected on the basis of pro-
fessional capacity and personal merit and not on a political, religious or geo-
graphical basis."33
MG, however, continued to clip the sections wings. Late in July 1946, the
Musikdmter (offices of the working committees on questions relating to profes-
sional musicians) had been abolished, registration regulations altered and licens-
ing placed under the jurisdiction of the section itself, thereby involving its
personnel in a "comet's tail of work" much of it involving the "complaints and
wails and moans of the disappointed." In March 1947, the blacklist was elimi-
nated for everyone but theater producers and directors, enabling the clearance
of all musicians and breaking yet another arrow in the sections quiver. The
more prominent musicians who had previously been blacklisted still needed to
be cleared by a German denazification tribunal, or Spruchkammer, before they
were allowed to perform, but outside Berlin, the process was entirely in local
hands. Two months later, orchestral personnel were reclassified as ordinary
labor, freeing them from all forms of screening.36
34. J. Evarts, Weekly Report, 12 October 1946, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Rela-
tions Division, Theater and Music Branch, Weekly Reports, Box 239; J. Evarts, "Diary: September
1946," 6.
35. J. Evarts, Weekly Report, 12 October 1946, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations
Division, Theater and Music Branch, Weekly Reports, Box 239.
36. C. Moseley to J. Clark, 10 May 1948, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations
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Knappertsbusch's return to the podium followed quickly on the cancellation
of the blacklist and it symbolized for Evarts the accumulating difficulties that
confronted the music officers. Although he denounced the conductor for the
"outrageous liberties" he took at his first concert, "Knappertsbusch admirers
were wildly enthusiastic about the eye-and-ear-full [sic] which they received.
An apparently well-organized clique raised their concerted voices at the end
with cries of 'We want Knappertsbusch back at the opera'." As Evarts realized,
the protracted cheering was a direct criticism of occupation policies. His black-
listing had changed Knappertsbusch from a potential symbol of German-
American cooperation into a monument to its injustice and a focus of its
opposition. His return to Munich concert halls (and Jochum's in the fall of
1947) not only provided a medium for the expression of safe and vocal oppo-
sition to the Americans, it also made illegitimate the positions of the incum-
bents at the Philharmonic and the Opera. Leitner was the first to feel the pinch
and, having failed to secure the Intendant's position and having no heart for the
growing fight, he left Munich for Stuttgart early in 1948. Solti remained at the
Operas podium, but a half-century later he still well recalled "the hysterical
screams of approval that greeted Knappertsbusch whenever he got near the
podium. Coexisting with him was terribly difficult for me."37
The music officers resisted the changes as best they could: they condemned
governmental influence in the affairs of the theaters and urged MG to limit
forcibly the Bavarian state s power "to such an extent that artistic considerations
and not party politics should have a preference." Rebuffed on this demand, they
then inflated their protests and called for a "decentralization" of the theaters
sufficient to free the Intendanten from state supervision. But nothing was done
and the situation became ever more frustrating for the section officers.
Increasingly, the Americans were finding that the authority they wielded was
personal rather than bureaucratic, meaning that where once they could compel
they could now merely influence. As the OMGUS branch chief declared rue-
fully, "it has been brought out rather strongly that Information Control is los-
ing its grip on the Germans and that they are inclined to regard Information
Control officers as losing their power."38
Division, Administrative Records of the Director's Office, Box 20; J. Evarts, Yearly Report of Music
Control in Bavariajuly 1946—July 1947,15 July 1947, Educational and Cultural Relations Division,
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bunal) decisions still needed to be approved by the Allied Kommandatura. P. Au Buchon to Theatre
and Music Licensees, 19 June 1947, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Theatre
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37. J. Evarts, Weekly Report, 10 April 1947, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations
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By early 1947, at the Philharmonic, Rosbaud was acutely conscious of the
weakness of his position as political and press criticism mounted. The
December 1946 elections had placed a solidly conservative CSU government
in office and cultural politics moved in decidedly more provincial, more con-
frontational, and more Catholic directions. He began to fight with the city's
music advisor, Dr. Konigsdorfer, and to come under fire from the music critic
at the influential Siiddeutsche Zeitung. Once again, it was Knappertsbusch's
hot breath he felt on his neck, while Jochum remained in the shadows.39
In February 1948, the city government, under whose jurisdiction the Phil-
harmonic came, used the excuse of impending currency reform to cancel
Rosbaud's still-active contract, a move many interpreted as an attack on the
contemporary music focus of his programming. Munich's mayor Scharnagl was
more specific about why the conductor was leaving, charging that he had
proven unwilling to submit to the city administration and seemed to regard his
authority as deriving from elsewhere. Rosbaud, he claimed, had refused to
accept the appointment of a second Kapellmeister and he had been resistant to
the idea of inviting prominent guest conductors (such as Jochum and Knap-
pertsbusch) to perform, as people "on all sides" were urging him to do. In sum,
Rosbaud seemed to believe that the Philharmonic was "his orchestra" and
that it should be "under his sole direction and answerable only to him." Cruelly
turning American policy back on itself, the city now charged that, because of
the nature of his initial appointment and the freedom that had been allowed
him under his contract, Rosbaud was an exemplar of the "Fiihrerprinzip" (leader
principle). A new conductor, appointed by the city with the support of the
Philharmonic, was necessary to restore "the democratic basis" of music life.
Luckily for Rosbaud, he had the luxury of another job offer and, choosing flight
over submission, he moved off to become the first director of the new
Sudwestfunk (Southwest radio) orchestra in the French Zone.40
Of all the American appointees, Solti hung on the longest. With the election
of the CSU, however, his position was also continually in question. His main
rival was not Knappertsbusch, whom state policy makers regarded as too way-
ward for the position of Opera director, but Jochum. As a by now almost help-
less Evarts editorialized in the summer of 1947, "the threat of Jochum is like
the sword of Damocles over the head of Solti." But the young conductor was
not without assets: he was, relative to other music directors, extraordinarily
Branch, Box 20; Minutes of General Information Control Meeting, 1 September 1947, OMGB,
Intelligence Division, ICD Intelligence Records, Box 114/52A,
39. H. Rosbaud to K. Scharnagl, 16 February 1947, Washington State University Archive, Hans
Rosbaud Papers, Box 6 file 89; and John Evarts to H. Rosbaud, 16 February 1947, Box 3 file 40.
40. Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 26 June 1948 and 29 June 1948; memo regarding the contract with Hans
Rosbaud, 26 February 1948, cited in Marita Krauss, Nachkriegskultur in Munchen: Miinchner stadtische
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inexpensive, he was extremely dynamic as a performer, he was already highly
regarded outside of Munich and he had many local supporters, including
Ministerpmsident (state president) Hans Ehard. Most importantly, he was a Jew,
and as Carl OrfF observed, the Kultusministerium could not force him out
because everyone would denounce it as anti-Semitic. As a result, Solti survived
his contract renewal in August 1948, but not unscathed: Jochum was installed
as principal guest conductor at the same salary for his fifteen performances that
Solti was earning for sixty-two. The 1949-1950 season, saw Jochum further
maneuvered into the heart of the Opera when it was decided that he would be
appointed to Leitner's old position of Opera manager, with Solti continuing as
chief conductor and music director. Desperate now, Solti grabbed at the first
passing offer, and in the fall of 1951 accepted the "demotion and punishment"
of a move to Frankfurt.41
From an American perspective, it is easy to condemn these machinations. But
for Bavaria's politicians and for many of its concert-goers, the removal of the
occupation s appointees was a declaration of independence. Music was enor-
mously important to people in those first postwar years; they had been deprived
of live performances when the theaters had been closed in October 1944, and
their reopening in the summer of 1945 was deeply meaningful. For people
living amid the debris of war, coping with the grinding realities of death,
destruction, hunger, and insecurity, music provided solace, excitement, and
entertainment. As the photographs of the densely packed, rapt, heavy-coated
concertgoers at the first postwar performances reveal, music, while not perhaps
releasing people from the harshness of life, at least provided them with a
momentary distraction. And more: for the first generation of postwar politicians
it was conceived as the "crystallization point" of the entire reconstruction
process, an encapsulation of both Wiedemujbau (reconstruction) and Forter-
haltung (continuity). The truth was that the public was unwilling to accept the
notion that its entire recent cultural development had been flawed by racism,
chauvinism, and militarism, and it saw in the glories of music performance the
justification for their beliefs. The centrality, transcendent humanity, and impor-
tance of the German musical canon was proof of the merits of their culture.42
Music halls needed reconstruction, some tainted performers had to be retired,
some few compositions prohibited, but what music needed more than any-
thing else, and what the public desired, was for the art, as they knew it, to be
carried on.
41. D. Sattler, "Aussprache mit Carl Orff," 7 November 1949, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte (IfZ),
ED 145, Bd 2; and D. Sattler, Vormerkung, 16 Julyl947, IfZ, ED 145, Bd 2;J. Evans, "Diary: Spring
and Summer 1947," 9; H. Miiller, Aktennotiz, 9 August 1948, BHstA, MK 50187; R. Hartmann to
D. Sattler, 28 November 1949, BHstA, MK 14395; Solti, Memoirs, 91.
42. Dr. Schwink to H. Meinzolt, 14 July 1945, L. Metzger, Aktennotiz, 20 July 1945 and F. Fendt
to W Hoegner, 6 May 1946, BHstA, MK 50007; F. Messmer makes this same point in "Miinchner
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The realization that the occupation forces were not going to leave even this
element of German art untouched caused great dismay and anger. For a people
sifting the rubble of their culture for evidence of goodness and greatness, the
blacklisting of beloved musicians was an attack on their search for reconciliation
with their own recent past, and the artists' subsequent clearance, within just one
year, made a mockery of the American measures as well. And yet, people
clearly had difficulty expressing resistance to American actions and defending
German culture in a country brimming with foreign soldiers. The result was
the culture politics of regional assertiveness. Having approved and encouraged
the rapid recuperation of the localities and Lander under its authority, MG sud-
denly confronted opposition from these very reconstituted polities.43 Time and
again, when justifying their differences with the Americans, municipal and Land
officials made reference to their Bavarian distinctiveness. The state's dynamic
fine arts advisor, Dieter Sattler, for example, in negotiations with Solti, empha-
sized that Jochum "wished for a return to his Bavarian roots." This was im-
portant, he said, for while Jochum "as a Bavarian" would remain in the city
through thick and thin, one could not ask the same of Solti, who, as a gifted
young foreigner, would doubtless "not want to remain in Munich during the
coming hard times" and for this reason, "it would not be right to hold him to
a contract if his heart were not in i t . . . The fact that Solti is a Jew," Sattler con-
cluded, and "he feels a special obligation to Jews, only adds to his [own] feel-
ings." In much the same way Mayor Scharnagl insisted that "since they must
reckon on Solti either in the long or short run quitting Munich, it would be
better to find someone now who through their [sic] personal relations with
Munich and Bavaria had a special interest in the Staatsoper."44
Provincial identifications were very strong in Bavaria and provided the basis
for the opposition to American cultural policies. Native Bavarians, it was main-
tained, were more dependable, loyal, and better understood the tastes of their
compatriots than outsiders. As the State Department's political advisor in
Germany despaired: "Bavaria is the citadel of what complacency still remains in
Germany [and] it has been less affected by change and has generally proved
resilient to the occupation." This was partly true, but it would still be mislead-
ing to understand the Bavarians' recourse to localism in quite such simple
terms. In the first place, not all local sons were treated with equal favor. Karl
Amadeus Hartmann, for example, had considerable difficulty with the Bavarian
43. School reform revealed a similar pattern as the Americans moved from control to "volun-
tary compulsion," local resistance mounted; see: Karl-Ernst Bungenstab, Umerziehung zur Demokratie?
Re-education Politik im Bildungswesen der US-Zone, 1945-1949 (Dusseldorf, 1970), 92-98; Tent,
Mission on the Rhine, 200; Winfried Miiller, Schulpolitik in Bayern im Spannungsfeld von Kultus-
burokratie und Besatzungsmacht (Munich, 1995).
44. D. Sattler to A. Hundhammer, 7 Mai 1947, BHstA, MK 50136; D. Sattler, Vormerkung, 16
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public and the premiere of his great contribution to local folklore, a chamber
opera based on a seventeenth-century tale, Simplicius Simplicisssimus, "almost
amounted to a scandal." The work was scheduled to open at the Schausspiel-
haus in June 1947, a few weeks before OrfF's Bernauerin, and the contrast be-
tween the two works could not have been more patent. For Hartmann, disaster
followed disaster as singers could not be secured, rehearsals not arranged,
and even Rosbaud, the scheduled conductor, sensed the mood and proved
difficult. No one, Evarts complained, "officially stuck by it to make it go on"
and the work was canceled; ultimately, it only received its first performance in
a radio concert broadcast ten months later. Similarly, the composer Werner Egk
never found Bavaria a congenial home and none of what he regarded as his
major works — Columbus, Peer Gynt, Circe — was performed there before 1950.
His great entrance into the postwar Munich cultural maelstrom was to be his
Faust ballet, Abraxas, but one scene in the work was considered lewd and the
ministry closed the work down after a single performance. Neither the
Americans nor the Bavarian public protested this act of censorship with any
particular vigor.4"1
Clearly, it was not simply a case of Bavarians favoring their own; nor was it
merely a question of the artist's connections with the occupation — Hartmann
was closely connected, Egk was not. Nor was the Bavarian public or state sim-
ply hostile to anything modern. Not wanting to appear too conservative, the
state did spend a good deal of money on the promotion of contemporary
music, something a Kultusministerium official noted was "in terms of cultural
politics of the utmost importance . . . [it] represents the most effective propa-
ganda regarding the progressiveness of Bavarian cultural politics." The
Philharmonic, whose members chafed under Rosbaud s modernist yoke, com-
plained that they wanted future conductors' contracts to limit the number of
contemporary works that might be performed. Even so, they were willing to
accept up to half of the regular season devoted to modern works. The public,
in the meantime, found Orff s music no obstacle and was — after some initial
hesitation — swept away with excitement by Hindemith's.46 Rather, it was in
each case a shifting combination of factors that assured success or failure —
American connections — if especially overt (as in the case of the conductors),
could be damaging, but so too could music that offended the conservative tastes
45. R. Murphy to Secretary of State, 19 February 1947, NA; RG 59, 862.00/2-1947; J. Evart,
"Diary: Spring-Summer 1947," 7; D. Sattler, Aktennotiz of conversation with W Egk, 23 August
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von Pufendorf and Michael Schoneich, eds., So viel Anfang war nie: Deutsche Sta'dte, 1945-1949
(Berlin, 1989), 145-47.
46. D. Sattler, Aktennotiz, 17 April 1947, BHstA, MK50129; C. Moseley to Dear and Good
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of the Bavarian public through its atonality. Sexual content might similarly be
tolerated in the abstract, as in Orff's wildly popular Carmina Burana, or even if
revealed in the independent theater or cabaret, but not in the home of the
Staatsoper.
But localism had other limits as well, for within it rested an unspoken na-
tional consciousness that sometimes twisted it in peculiar ways. There was, for
instance, nothing about Jochums or Knappertsbusch's actual conducting, and
little enough about their repertoire, that was distinctively Bavarian. While
Jochum did perform Orff's and Pfitzner's works in Munich, Knappertsbusch
seldom played anything more modern than Bruckner. Despite the emphasis on
the artists' local connections, people like Jochum or Knappertsbusch were
figures of national importance and the music they played was closely identified
with the mainstream of German cultural traditions. In this way, perhaps, they
brought together both provincialism and national identifications, and the
acceptability of the latter was in part made possible because it seemed subsumed
under the former. A people humiliated as a national collective might channel
their unexpressed connection to the whole in the guise of a pronounced
provincialism. Which is not to say that the performers' local connections were
not a factor — this was their home audience — but in this regard it is notable
that neither of Munich's two favorite conductors ultimately secured positions
in the city. When Sold left the Staatsoper, the top contestants for the position
were all non-Bavarians: Karl Bohm.Joel Perlea, Rudolf Kempe, Erich Kleiber.
Kempe, born in Saxony and most closely associated with the Opera in
Chemnitz and the Symphony in Dresden, was the one who got the job. At the
Philharmonic, Rosbaud's successor was the 35-year old Fritz Rieger from
Mannheim. He would, it was hoped, prove a new "Kabasta-Wunder," a refer-
ence to another non-Bavarian and one who had done so much to convince
Munich's concertgoers that the Philharmonic was a front-rank orchestra.47
Strangely enough, the great sentimental favorites might have served as leverage
against the Americans and a focus for local identification, but they were passed
over for cheaper, younger musicians. And yet, somehow, these distinctions were
not always perceived. When Rieger took over at the Philharmonic, one excited
fan declared: "now we have our own conductor again; now we will really
hear music!"48 The connection made to Kabasta was therefore not accidental; it
was as though closure had come through a return to the past and with it a psy-
chic expiation of the occupation of which Rosbaud was so evidently a symbol.
What is so significant is that the return of power to Bavarians, which was linked
47. Siiddeutsclie Zeitung, 16 October 1948.
48. R. Hartmann to L. Meinzolt, 15 October and 29 October 1951, BHscA, MK50055; F. Hink
to Miinchner Philharmoniker, 6 April 1949, Stadtarchiv Miinchen, 1563; Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 16
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in the public and administrative mind to a rebirth of local musical traditions,
was to be accomplished through outsiders.49
Outsiders connected provincialism to nationalism in other ways as well, for
fueling Bavaria's cultural politics was the miasma of anti-Americanism.
Although some individual Americans, such as Edward Kilenyi and John Evarts,
were held in high regard by the Germans who worked with them, personal
admiration could not overcome contempt for a culture. The music officers'
most difficult task, Evarts' successor, Carlos Moseley, recalled, was to convince
the Germans "that America was not made up of barbarians, but was made up
of a great number of highly cultivated people."50 There was nothing especially
Bavarian about this anti-Americanism; it was common throughout Germany
and its roots extended back into the nineteenth century. But in the first post-
war years, this disdain for America — the conviction that it was a land of
machines, crime, and money, without Geist or Kultur — served to empower the
occupied people. In a sense, contempt for American culture was as crucial as the
veneration of Goethe or Beethoven to the resuscitation of a German nation, as
it gave the people confidence that the barbarians could never subdue what they
could not understand. Germany might be occupied, the people could whisper
to themselves, but America would never vanquish its spirit and art.51
After June 1946, the American music officers could do little to combat this
resurgent nationalism cum regionalism. The successive waves of OMGUS pol-
icy had washed over them, propelling them forward, pulling them back, and
ultimately burying them in the sand. At the close of a year of work, the section
had lost its coercive power and with it the authority to push the ministry and
the public along the path of reeducation. Increasingly, the job of the music
officer became that of the cultural observer and lobbyist, and so it might have
remained had yet another policy shift one year later not produced a new
49. Sabine Henze-Dohring finds similar irony in U.S. policy regarding the Bayreuth Festspiel.
Unable, in the face of heavy local resistence, to remake the Wagner Festival into an event featuring
international classics and experimental works, the section watched the Wagner family restored to its
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emphasis on the promotion of American art culture. The music office thus con-
tinued its work, adding American works to the general program of modern
music promotion. But things did not become any easier. For Carlos Moseley,
German audiences in 1948 remained "out of touch in general with the real
music world." Like Evarts before him, he would do all he could "to get more
modern music played and heard" and, with the gradual weakening of restric-
tions on travel, would use section money to sponsor visits by a number of cel-
ebrated international performers. Still, Moseley was no more confident than
Evarts had been of the effect all this was having, for as he remarked to a friend
in March 1948, "the American impression on Germans is still only skin-deep."52
In this sense, one can judge the MG's efforts in Bavaria's music field a failure,
but not by every measure. True, denazification had proved a fiasco to people at
the time: chaotically introduced, unsystematically applied, and too rapidly ter-
minated. If the point of it all had been to make Bavaria's artists come to terms
with their own guilt and complicity in the crime that was the Third Reich, it
was a massive disappointment. Moreover, the music section had not been able
to shake the German public from their belief in the superiority of their art-
culture, nor had they been able to turn the mainstream of the concert audience
into ardent lovers of contemporary music. The internationalism in music that
the music officers tried to build similarly came apart on the shoals of the nation-
alism cum localism that MG had itself inadvertently encouraged. Bavarians were
not yet ready to choose Europe. To the credit of the Americans, however, their
failures were in large measure a result of having set their expectations so high.
Moreover, there were successes. Thanks in part to the music officers' efforts,
concert life returned to Bavaria quickly after the war and the quality of per-
formance, if not exalted, was at least professional and the repertoire varied.
Music that had been silenced for more than a decade was once again available
and much that had never been heard was now heard. Through the efforts of the
cultural division and its German collaborators, new-music societies, such as
Musica Viva and the Studio fur Neue Musik had been formed that would prove
of great importance to the emerging generation of artists. Further, the section
had resisted the temptation to impose American forms on the German base,
and, while fighting what it saw as an abuse of governmental power, had not
questioned the principle that the state had a positive role to play in cultural pro-
duction. These were all fine, lasting, and important achievements. But what
should really be recognized in the work of the music section is that it had gen-
erally been carried out by exceptionally competent people who acted, by and
large, in sensible ways. They may have failed in many of the goals they set them-
selves, but it was not due to their own incompetence, inefficiency, or lack of
familiarity with German society and culture. Nor were they ideologues, even
52. C. Moseley to Helen 30 March 1948 (copy in author's possession).
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though they did act on the basis of a belief that Germany must be transformed
into a crossroads for European cultural influences if the dangers of Nazism were
to be permanently eradicated. The music officers were committed to the quin-
tessentially American idea that familiarity might produce empathy and they saw
music — the ultimate international language — as a mechanism for ensuring
Germany's peaceful development. In all this their assumptions might have been
naive — in some ways even arrogant — and their failures may have seemed
large, but their efforts were nonetheless commendable.
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